The Dynamics of Legislative Debate Participation

The prevailing view in the literature on democratic presidentialism is that legislative speeches are primarily symbolic in nature, devoid of meaningful political ramifications, and serve as post hoc justifications for decisions influenced by factors outside of parliamentary debate (Taylor 2021). Hence, it follows that there is a scarcity of research on speechmaking practices in authoritarian and backsliding regimes, and little examination of whether characteristics common to democratic legislatures are present in these regimes as well. This first empirical chapter aims to contribute to this understudied area by conducting a comprehensive examination of speechmaking in the Russian Duma, leveraging the opportunity to compare the differences between democratic and electoral authoritarian regimes.

The development of speechmaking practices in the Russian case presents a puzzling phenomenon: time spent on the legislative floor increases, despite increased governmental scrutiny over legislators' floor access. Yet, in the Seventh convocation there is an abrupt change direction Moreover, previous research demonstrates that floor time during the democratic periods is associated with higher legislative scrutiny, but floor time is not explanatory for policymaking during authoritarian periods (Noble 2020, 1440). Therefore, the intent behind speechmaking must vary along with regime type. It is reasonable to expect that the constraints undergirding speechmaking may differ as well – something that is not addressed in Noble's study. Existing scholarship is still yet to establish how speechmaking practices have changed over time in relation to legislators' access to the floor.

Previous scholarship on the Duma has extensively the Duma's institutional development over the past three decades, but has largely overlooked the significance of debate institutions, choosing to focus on roll-call voting, distributive politics, party cohesion, and the relationship between the Duma and the executive (e.g., Remington 2006; Chaisty 2005; Kunicova and Remington 2008; Chaisty 2013). This trend is likely due to the perception that debates have declined in relevance since 2003 and the establishment of United Russia's dominant party system (Goode 2010). However, this perspective only assesses the 'relevance' of debates in terms of their policy outputs and not their substantive use for the regime. Therefore, there remains a need for a comprehensive examination of legislative speech beginning with an analysis of how speech changes over time.

I argue that the Duma is characterised by an increasing interest in controlling debate on the parliamentary floor, resulting in greater scrutiny over legislative access even though aggregate floor time increases. The heightened scrutiny over floor access seeks to exclude of opposition backbenchers and increase the participation of key members (read: leadership) of the systemic opposition and dominant party, limiting incipient dissent and providing stronger avenues for party unity. The Duma accomplishes these tasks through a combination of informal party-based delegation arrangements and ad-hoc tightening of the formal rules of procedure to centralise debates within these key deputies. This argument highlights the importance of understanding the dynamic nature of legislative debates under different regime types and the ways in which it is ultimately controlled in non-democratic settings.

Empirical evidence suggests that during the earlier periods of power struggle in the Russian Duma, *individual* speechmaking was heightened. During those periods, longer speeches were primarily concentrated among opposition members, the party and Duma leadership, and committee chairs. This trend is exemplified by the Second Convocation, which saw a significant number of lengthy speeches, including the exceptional incident on May 13, 1999, when the leadership of the Communist Party (KPRF) gave the three longest speeches in Duma history during the attempted impeachment proceedings against President Yeltsin (12,593 words delivered by three high ranking deputies in a single meeting). This event stands out in contrast to all other high word count speeches, which are typically delivered on separate occasions addressing issues such as the budget, regulations, and security.

In general, speeches diminish in length after this tumultuous early period. This may be the result of a rule change in 2000 that limited the amount of floor time available to individual deputies (see Table 2). Over the next decade during the backsliding period, there were two further changes to the rules of procedure regarding speech length. However, from 2010 to 2012, there were eight amendments to the Duma's rules concerning speech length and participation coinciding with the coalescing authoritarianism, suggesting that the government started to place heavier direct scrutiny over debate practices. This indicates that the government has had a growing interest in the role and effectiveness of parliamentary debates, especially during its later periods where its capacity to influence the legislature significantly increased.

The most significant changes to the formal rules occurred between April and September 2012. On June 5th, 2012, opposition parties united to delay a contentious vote on a law introducing severe fines against protestors. These parties, referred to as 'systematic opposition', extended the session well into the night, with the final vote being adopted after approximately 14 hours of discussion, filibustering attempts, and around 400 proposed amendments.[1] Despite these efforts, the opposition ultimately failed due to the chair reducing the time allocated to individual amendment propositions and speeches. As Noble and Schulmann note, this united opposition was not tolerated and resulted in consequences such as the stripping of Gennady Gudkov's (of *A Just Russia*) mandate, the dismissal of his son (a fellow *A Just Russia* deputy) from the party, censure of Ilya Ponomarev, and the alteration of the Duma rules to prevent future instances of filibustering (Noble and Schulmann 2018).

One might expect that the 2012 amendments to the regulations, which significantly increased the government's power to limit speech time, would lead to a decrease in session length over time. However, as shown in *Figure 3*, this does not appear to be the case. In fact, the aggregate time spent in the chamber increased after the implementation of these amendments. This finding coincides with the promises made by Volodin, the Chairperson in the Seventh convocation, to keep deputies in their seats during convocation. This promise suggests that the government recognizes the potential uses of speechmaking and aims to direct it in an optimal outcome rather than limiting it entirely. Therefore, floor time is not necessarily 'purposeless', as data on its relationship with bill velocity and amendments might suggest (e.g., Noble 2020). To fully understand the dynamics underlying these changes, it is necessary to pay attention to the variations between convocations and regime types that produce this trend.

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[1] See the transcripts of the plenary session no. 31 http://transcript.duma.gov.ru/node/3652/, State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.

Recent research by Noble has called into question previous understandings of the role of the Duma during Russia's backsliding and authoritarian moments. According to Noble, the Duma serves as a venue where the executive can address policy preferences, information asymmetries, and commitment problems using the legislative process (Noble 2018; 2017). While legislators may have some influence in amendment authorship when bills are hampered down and gridlocked during the legislative process, Noble argues that it is incorrect to attribute this influence to genuine legislative action since deputies often sponsor extraparliamentary amendments without engaging in debate or substantive authorship (2018, 1435). It follows that there has been relatively little focus on the debate participation during the legislative phase of policymaking (as opposed to pre-parliamentary or committee-level phases), which is surprising since, ostensibly, debates may reveal the positions of executive bodies or sectoral interests.

In fact, there is a long-standing recognition of the influence of business interests in the Duma and in elected positions more broadly (Chaisty 2013a; 2013b; Ostrow 2000; Szakonyi 2020). Some scholars have even suggested that electoral interests have clear implications for speechmaking (see, e.g., Chaisty 2013b). However, our understanding of the process behind speechmaking is limited. For example, Chaisty's work indicates that sectoral ties have a significant impact on the likelihood of debating relevant legislation, and patterns of sectoral involvement remain across convocations, even as the relative power of the Duma has declined (especially regarding the state budget). Additionally, the rationale behind business involvement in the Duma has shifted since the period of increased executive control starting in the Fourth Duma, with deputies drawn to the Duma due to the protections and privileges it offers rather than legislative power (2013b, 731-733). Chaisty's findings suggest differences between convocations in terms of the strength of parliamentary institutions over debates (2013b), but he does not go on to systematically examine how this variation arises or if it affects speechmaking practices, as that question falls outside the scope of his study. The literature lacks an understanding of *how* these debate institutions have evolved or what these changes mean for parliamentary participation. This is a crucial gap in our knowledge of legislative politics in Russia.

This chapter aims to deepen our understanding of debate institutions in Russia, which can be divided into formal and informal institutional 'rules', which are dynamic over time. Magar argues that these institutions often come into tension, particularly in presidential contexts (2021). Formal institutions are those that decentralise debate by granting deputies greater rights to participation (e.g., through the rules of procedure). In contrast, informal institutions centralise debate through the party system, since parties delegate access to parliamentary concessions and privileges like committee posts (Magar 2021, 1). In other words, informal institutions create a unique delegation of access that is determined by the party system. As such, debate participation is arbitrary according to party preferences: hence, an informal participatory structure. It is therefore important to consider the evolution of the rules of procedure and party system over time and across convocations when considering debates. This chapter presents evidence of a noticeable and significant difference in speechmaking practices between the first five and last two convocations, reflecting these tensions.

I address shortcomings in the literature by presenting an overview of debate institutions in Russia since 1994 and analysing floor access and time spent on the parliamentary floor. These two dependent variables provide insight into the institutions that govern plenary debate. The former captures the number of speeches made by deputies, while the latter measures the length of time they spend on the floor. To do so, I first provide an overview of the party system and institutional context of legislative debate in Russia. I then proceed to the main analysis, which is based on a novel dataset of 388,201 speeches spread across 35,883 debate questions extracted from the Duma API (http://api..duma.gov.ru) at the legislator level. I also obtained legislator meta-data by scraping Duma and party websites and manually collecting missing variables and cases. The final cleaned dataset presented here includes 103,452 speeches made by 1610 legislators, after excluding speeches made in first convocation, from deputies with missing data, and speeches under 50 words.

Institutional Setting of Russian Legislative Debates

The Council of the State Duma plays a crucial role in facilitating the Duma's work. Among other tasks, it is responsible for producing the draft program of legislative work for the next session, including bills during sessions, forming draft calendars for the consideration of issues, scheduling additional meetings, drafting procedures for the work of the Duma, calling extraordinary meetings, allocating draft laws to committees, and sending draft laws to the government. The Council is made up of the elected Duma leadership – the Chairperson, First Deputy Chairs, Deputy Chairs – and faction leaders (Collected Legislation of the Russian Federation 2020, Chapter 1; Chapter 2). The elected positions are nominated by factions, and, in practice, the voting rules favour the ruling party in terms of chairmanships.

The chairperson fulfils a typical speaker role, overseeing meetings, managing the daily work of the chamber, and chairing the Council of the Duma. In essence, they control the operation of the Duma, including the handling of issues and bills. The other deputies also have roles as substitutes for the chairperson or in their own capacity to form expert councils related to committee jurisdiction and evaluation of draft laws (Ibid., Chapter 1). The latter capacity has a direct impact on the policy-making process as it allows them to delay bills and shape their development. It follows that these posts are highly sought after and protected.

Most of the work of the Duma is carried out at the committee level, which is the primary vehicle for introducing and amending bills. The committee system has evolved from a non-majoritarian format during the First and Second Convocations to a majoritarian format with the rise of United Russia dominance in the early 2000s (Chaisty 2005a). During the early period, the highly coveted committee leadership posts were divided among parties. However, this changed when Unity (and later United Russia) took committee posts by force (Remington 2007). While, by the Seventh Convocation, some sense of proportionality returned (Sakwa 2020). Committee posts (particularly chairpersonships) are essential as they provide direct access to the legislative process, allowing chairpersons may significantly impact the way a bill is introduced or amended.

According to the rules, no deputy may speak without the permission of the chair presiding. The chair has the authority to interrupt or limit the speech of deputies who do not adhere to the regulations governing their speech. For instance, if a speaks for longer than their allocated time, the chairperson may interrupt. Similarly, if they deviate from the topic of discussion, the chairperson may issue a warning and an interruption in the case of repeated deviations. Additionally, the chairperson has the right to determine the duration of time allotted to a given issue (including extending speaking time) (Ibid., Chapter 5).

The Council is responsible for developing the draft procedure for meetings. It considers the proposals of committees regarding which issues to bring to the floor and makes its decision based on the proposed monthly program of legislative work. Bills are included in the order of their reading, starting with the third and moving to the first in order of priority. Additionally, deputies are permitted to petition to alter the procedure for the work of a meeting (Ibid., Chapter 2).

For a typical parliamentary meeting (not including hearings), there are six main debate types governed by different articles in the regulations (see Table 1). For most debates, deputies must register their intention to speak and be included on the list of speakers for a given issue (issues being defined by the Council prior to the day’s session and voted on at the start of the meeting by deputies in attendance). Deputies on the list who do not have an opportunity to speak during the prescribed time limit (proposed by the chairperson) may attach a signed copy of their speech to the parliamentary transcript. Most debates must follow the prescribed list order. However, speeches given by faction representatives follow their own order, which is determined by the faction leadership.

As previously mentioned, draft procedure debates allow three minutes per speaker for a total of 25 minutes. These debates involve the discussion and voting on the proposed order of a plenary session set out by the Council. The debate cap may be lifted with a majority vote. Legislative questions, which are designed to prepare draft laws and go through three readings, allow for committee members responsible for the draft to answer and defend points of order: deputies are given seven minutes each. According to Chapter Five of the Regulations, procedural speeches cover a wide range of issues, including the announcement of proposals and the justification for accepting or rejecting amendments. These speeches are given three minutes. Committee reports present draft laws for consideration or report on changes made in later readings. These are given 15 minutes, while co-reports and concluding remarks are given 5 minutes.

Draft resolutions, which are mainly related to constitutional issues or the regulations of the Duma, are noteworthy because factions are given priority in speaking. Each faction may submit a representative who is allowed to speak for up to seven minutes, while deputies outside the faction are given three minutes. Additionally, there is a cap of 35 minutes for these debates. The submitting member of the resolution gets a right of reply for concluding remarks. Similarly, faction representatives (up to three per faction) may discuss current events and topical issues for 10 minutes per faction on Tuesdays and Thursdays, while deputies outside of factions are given 10 minutes every month and based on their appeals (Ibid., Chapter 5). The final point is the only time when the chairperson has direct control over the order of speeches.

Table 1. Debate Types in the Duma

Debate type	Goal	Duration	Selector
1. Draft procedure	Discuss and vote on the order of a plenary session	3 Minutes (25 total)	List order
2. Legislative questions:	Prepare law or draft law/ position-taking	7 Minutes	List order
a. First reading			
b. Second reading			
c. Third reading			
3. Procedural Issues	Change working order, right of reply, messaging, etc.	3 Minutes	List order
4. Committee reports:	Move for floor consideration		List order
a. Reports		15 Minutes	
b. Co-reports		5 Minutes	
c. Concluding remarks		5 Minutes	
5. Draft resolutions	Institutions, government, and constitution		
a. Faction representatives		7 Minutes	Faction/List order
b. Other deputies		3 Minutes	List order
6. Current events and other issues	Position taking		
a. Faction representatives		10 Minutes total	Faction/ List order
b. Other deputies		10 minutes (every two months)	Chairperson

Subsequently, the transcripts of the Duma include six primary categories of issue-questions. These include debates pertaining to a bill in the first, second, third, as well as those that occur during exceptional additional readings. Additionally, the Duma may consider laws rejected by the

Federation Council and the President. The remaining portion of proceedings are dedicated to discussions of current events, draft resolutions, and procedural matters. As depicted in *Figure 1*, it is apparent that most speeches occur during the first reading. The second highest number of speeches are directed towards procedural issues, current events, or draft resolutions. This is followed by a declining number of speeches during the second and third readings, and finally, a minority of speeches pertain to bills rejected by the President or Federation Council or those that are considered after the third reading.

Figure 1. Count of Debate Types in the Duma (all speeches)



According to Chapter Five of the Regulations, the articles governing floor time have been amended at least 11 times (see Table 2). Most of these amendments took place after United Russia became the party of power, suggesting that the government pays attention to floor access to some degree. It is worth reiterating that the amendments in 2012 correspond with changers in speechmaking practices and increased executive control over floor access in the Duma.

Table 2. Amendments to the Reglament

Article and Section	Current Rule*	Amendment Year(s)
Article 50 Section 5	No more than 25 overall minutes shall be allotted for discussion of draft procedure	2005, 2010
Article 56 Section 1	The duration of reports, co-reports, and closing words is established by the chairperson in agreement with the speakers and rapporteurs, but should not exceed 15 minutes for a report, five minutes for a co-report, and five minutes for a final word.	2000, 2010, 2012 (April)
Article 56 Section 2	The speaker is given up to seven minutes. For speeches regarding procedures or amendments, the speaker is given up to three minutes.	2012 (April), 2012 (Sept)
Article 56 Section 5	The chairperson may establish the total discussion of an issue and extent time for a speech with consent of the majority	2012 (April)
Article 59 Section 1	Discussion of an issue may be terminated after its time expires or by decision of the Duma	2012 (April)
Article 59 Section 2	The chairperson may give deputies who did not speak on an issue floor time.	2007, 2012 (April)

Note: Data are from the Reglament of the Duma (2020); author's own translation.

As a result, I anticipate observing variation across convocations as the government attempts to consolidate the party system. The development of the party system is intimately linked with the implementation of the formal rules governing the Duma, which aim to centralise party control at the expense of individual legislative action.

Taylor finds that in democratic presidential systems, in contrast to parliamentary models, the rules of procedure tend to provide greater leeway and freedom of action in debates, as legislators in these systems are often more focussed on local concerns (e.g., campaigning), possess greater autonomy, and parties exhibit less coherence (Taylor 2021). In other words, the electoral and party systems determine the rules of procedure which govern legislative debate and the executive does not have the power to intervene on the formal rules (Proksch and Slapin 2015). However, in the authoritarian case, the rules of procedure are clearly not optimised according to electoral considerations otherwise, they would vary according to the electoral changes between the mixed and proportional systems. Moreover, as the executive wields stronger informal power such through party-based controls, the potential capacity for autonomous debate participation weakens.

Party Politics in the Duma

The institutional setting of the parliament cannot be understood without considering the role of parties in governmental agenda setting, as the Duma provides a forum for resolving intra-executive and executive-legislative disputes (Noble 2018). As a result, the party system is particularly important for the functioning of the executive and has undergone several changes over time, moving from an weakly consolidated system (Golosov 2002) to a stronger party of power system (Golosov 2017). This development highlights the shifting dynamics between democratic and authoritarian politics and offers insight into how democratic institutions are subverted over time and the ways which they retain and evolve in their original purposes. Therefore, it provides information on speechmaking practices. For instance, the electoral rules allocating seats demonstrate how the later regime manipulated the electoral process to achieve desired outcomes, and they also provide a useful metric for analysing changes in speechmaking practices.

However, no research has examined how these parliamentary dynamics affect floor speech. Nevertheless, we have potential priors about what these effects should demonstrate. Proksch and Slapin predict that in mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) systems, SMD and PR members exhibit different legislative behaviours due to their distinctive incentive structures. SMD members are expected to speak slightly more than their PR colleagues because the latter are elected based on party, while the former are elected based on their personal vote. However, party leaders will continue to place a strong emphasis on party unity (Proksch and Slapin 2015, 51). Hence, the closed-list proportional period (2007-2016) should place a greater emphasis on party unity compared to the other periods, resulting in more tightly controlled floor time. As a result, the formal institutions that govern speechmaking should have little effect or a decreasing effect over time as the party system consolidates into its current state. For example, SMD deputies should speak relatively less during the authoritarian period, as party unity becomes more important than during the democratic periods. *Table 3* shows the electoral regulations by convocation.

Table 3. Electoral Regulations by Convocation[2]

Convocation	Seat Assignment	PR Signatures	PR Threshold
First (1993–1995)	PR/SMD	100,000	5.0%
Second (1995–1999)	PR/SMD	200,000	5.0%**
Third (1999–2003)*	PR/SMD	200,000	5.0%***
Fourth (2003–2007)	PR/SMD	200,000	5.0%
Fifth (2007–2011)	PR	200,000	7.0%

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[2] Data are collected from the Central Election Commission. *From 1999, Parties and SMD candidates may pay an electoral deposit to secure their spot on the list, returnable if they win 3.0% or 5.0% of the vote. *Invalid votes are counted towards the threshold. ***If parties reach 5% of the vote but less than 50% of the vote, parties with 3.0% or above would win seats as well. However, if the parties winning seats still result in less than 50% of the vote, a repeat election is held. ****However, parties with 5.0-6.0% will get 1 seat and those with 6.0-7.0% will get 2 seats.

Sixth (2011–2016)	PR	150,000	7.0%****
Seventh (2016–2021)	PR/SMD	200,000	5.0%

The first four convocations were elected using a mixed member model with a 50/50 split between proportional and single-mandate districts, while the Fifth and Sixth moved to proportional representation, and the Seventh returned to the original system. This is significant because deputies in the single-mandate districts were the most likely to break party ranks (Kunicova and Remington 2008a), implying that the rule change in 2007 (Fourth) and 2011 (Fifth) aimed to establish a stronger party system (Noble and Schulmann 2018, 52). It is no coincidence that the party system that emerged under these conditions became cartelised with systemic opposition rather than genuine challengers to the regime (Hutcheson 2018).

The First and Second Duma in the 1990s were less consolidated compared to the later Dumas. During this period, the system itself was fragmented among several parliamentary groups. In the First Duma, 12 parties and groups divided the floor along pro- and anti-government lines, while the Second Duma saw outright oppositional behaviour from the majority Communist and leftist blocs (Noble and Schulmann 2018, 53). Importantly, the parliament used the regulations to protect itself from executive overreach. For example, parties could amend legislation with written notes if they obtained enough of a mandate (Shevchenko and Golosov 2011). This era was also characterised by nonpartisan – independent – politicians who were supported by resources outside the party system and who, for the most part, represented regional and sectoral interests (Hale 2006; Gel'man 2008; 2006). However, as the party system consolidated in the 2000s, these independents were absorbed into specific parties, particularly, United Russia (see Figure 1). These manoeuvres by the government to coalesce a stronger party system and neutralise party opposition in the Duma contribute to regime stability.

The reglament has also been amended to accommodate the evolving party of power system and increase executive oversight in the legislative process. As Shevchenko and Golosov observe, the legislative draft schedule is prepared for the immediate sitting only, thereby limiting deputies' ability to make strategic decisions or exert full control over the policy process (2011, 206). Additionally, they also note that the timing of deputy reports and speeches has been reduced since 2000, with reports and co-reports now only permitted to run for 15 minutes as opposed to 30 mins (2011, 206). Furthermore, the government holds informal power over the sequencing of bills, as regulations stipulate that a bill may be rejected after the first reading by the relevant committee and upon approval of the Council. Given that the ruling party has captured these positions over time, it can be expected that they exert significant control over the agenda on the floor.

Figure 2. Seats in the Dumas by Top Four Factions per Convocation



Notes: Data for convocations one through six were acquired from RussiaVotes.org (2015)[3]. The data is acquired from the Central Election Commission (Central Election Commission 2016).[4] This graph shows the legislative structure of the Duma for each convocation. Seats are counted by their allotment after the election (i.e., accounting for deputies incorporating into factions). I include a category, 'others', as a metric that includes worse performing parties and vacant seats. Independents have two categories since Regions of Russia Independents constituted a group.

The development of a strong pro-governmental party system carries several important implications for speechmaking. According to conventional wisdom, the strengthening of the party system and tightening of the formal rules of the reglament should increase the effectiveness of informal constraints on speechmaking. Specifically, we would expect that party-related variables such as committee chairs and their deputies, Duma leadership, faction percent, and membership in the ruling party, to significantly affect speech propensities. For example, party capture of committees should incentivise important committee members to speak more over time as they become representative for the party's position. The Duma leadership, which is effectively a stand in for top-party members, is likely to remain constant as these positions are mainly procedural and relate to individualistic perks of office. Moreover, an increase in the percentage of United Russia deputies should reduce floor access for other parties and encourage intraparty competition for floor time favouring leaders over backbenchers. Accordingly, United Russia backbenchers might be expected to speak less frequently over time.

Description of Variables

In this chapter, I investigate floor access and participation in the Duma. My analysis focuses on debate participation at the convocation level, with a dependent variable measuring this concept. In line with the recommendations of Slapin and Proksch, I exclude all speeches shorter than 50 words from my analysis by coding them as 0 as they may not be considered genuine contributions to debate (2021). A value of 0 still provides valuable information about participation. I also exclude procedural speeches given by the chairperson presiding over the meeting.

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[3] Levada Center and the Centre for the Study of Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde.

[4] http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/

To ensure the robustness of my analysis, I include an aggregate modelling approach in the appendix which includes two model specifications and controls for convocation. The first dependent variable (*DV1*), found in the appendix, is calculated by summing the number of speeches a deputy makes on a given day and aggregating these results into a convocation level count. The primary specification, *DV2,* measures the total number of words per convocation divided by the speeches per convocation period. This controls time spent on the floor for the opportunities for floor access. *DV1* is a count measure of the number of speeches given, while *DV2* measures the amount of floor time per convocation controlling for the number of speeches. These specifications allow us to gain insight into both the frequency of speeches given and the time spent giving them.

The table below presents summary statistics of the dependent variables and covariates of interest. The sample includes 2,547 observations of deputies across convocations. On average, each convocation has a median of 46 speeches given by deputies, with a total of 4,897 words spoken. *DV1*, which measures the number of speeches given, exhibits a right skew due to the overdispersion present in speech count, where the variance is higher than the mean. A small percentage (2.28%, or 58 deputies) did not speak or spoke less than 50 words at any given meeting. As a result, I use a negative binomial approach for analysing *DV1* (Appendix). For *DV2*, a continuous measure of floor time per convocation, I use ordinary least squares as this provides more interpretable results. The models cluster standard errors by deputy.

Table 4. Descriptive Statistics

	mean	median	sd	min	max	*n*
N speeches (*DV1*)	239.0495	46	685.4848	0	11897	2547
N words/speeches (*DV2*)	117.2919	89.7826	110.1986	0	1275.107	2547
N words	14941.69	4897	31925.41	0	533,763	2547

Exposure	1242.481	1381	404.8917	1	1733	2547
Party share	0.368344	0.25111	0.277307	0.0044	0.746667	2547
Seats	164.8402	113	124.1374	2	336	2547
Committee share	0.054964	0.0381786	0.044549	0.00232	0.22527	2547
Seniority	6.095135	3.9917921	4.55725	0.046512	25.4829	2547
Age	53.70084	53.931507	10.47242	25.27671	89.45479	2547

	0	1	Total	*n*
Spoke	2.2772	97.7228	100	2547
Ruling party	46.83942	53.16058	100	2547
Party leader	98.19395	1.806046	100	2547
Duma leadership	97.95838	2.041618	100	2547
Committee chair	92.26541	7.73459	100	2547
Committee deputy chair	64.74283	35.25717	100	2547
SMD	67.13781	32.86219	100	2547
Gender (female)	87.71103	12.28897	100	2547

In this sample, *DV1* has a mean of 239.05 speeches per convocation and a maximum of 11,897, while *DV2* has a mean of 89.78 words and a maximum of 1275.107. The distribution of the number of words per convocation ranges from 0 to 533,763, with a mean of 14,941.69. This suggests that some deputies use much more floor time on average than others. For instance, Vladimir Zhirinovsky used more than twice as many words as the next highest-ranking speakers.

Figure 2 provides insight into the mean structure of *DV2* by displaying the trend lines of words spoken per day, sorted by convocation. A LOESS line is also included for each convocation to highlight the variations in within-convocation trends. Despite the sharp drop in 2018, the mean number of words per session increased 10% from the First convocation to the Seventh. A cursory examination of the figure suggests the development of certain trends that align with prior expectations about the Duma. For instance, there is a significant decrease in the amount of time spent in the chamber towards the end of the Fourth Duma. This is consistent with the implementation of a new electoral system that eliminated single-member districts, which may have influenced SMD members to reduce their participation on the floor. Additionally, the Sixth and Seventh convocations appear significantly different from the others, which warrants further investigation.

Figure 3. Daily Number of Words Spoken in the Duma by Convocation [repeated from earlier chapter]



***Note*:** Data are acquired from the Duma API (http://api.duma.gov.ru). The graph is colored by the mean number of words spoken during a given convocation, where opaqueness equals a higher mean.

The regression models include two main sets of explanatory and control variables that capture the status and characteristics of the members.[5] These variables are divided into two categories: *Status* and *Deputy*. The *status* variables indicate the relative position of a deputy and their appointments, while the *deputy* variables capture the individual-level characteristics of deputies. As in Slapin and Proksch (2021), I consider age, age squared, and exposure as controls. Explanatory variables cover gender, seniority, majority, leadership roles, vote type, and party and committee shares.

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[5] They follow Slapin and Prokch's classification scheme given in *The Politics of Legislative Debates* and as such follow the other authors in that book (2021; Magar 2021).

To identify majority party status, I use a dummy variable derived from seats in parliament by party (and corresponding coalitions). While United Russia dominated the Fourth convocations and beyond, the Second and Third convocations (prior to April 2002) had different party dynamics due to the significant size of the Communist Party. This means that United Russia or its predecessors would be inappropriate dummies to use as a status variable for majority party in those convocations. In line with Slapin and Proksch (2021) and Magar (2021), I include majority status as it is useful for understanding the value that deputies place on debates. If deputies value debates as potentially relevant for legislative outcomes or politics in general, the majority party is likely to demand more access to the floor, while minority members may request additional time at their expense (Magar 2021). Additionally, I also include the share of the party in parliament as it is plausible that the larger the percentage of parliament a party occupies, the more difficult it becomes for individual members to gain floor access.

Next, I include dummy variables for committee allocations. I differentiate between the committee chair and the first and second deputy chairs, as the chairperson typically presents the reading for bills submitted through their committee, while deputy chairs perform various other functions for their committee (such as updating the chamber on amendments, requesting support, proposing resolutions, and questioning government bodies) (Collected Legislation of the Russian Federation 2020, Chapter 4). In line with the logic behind the faction percent variable, I also include a variable for committee share. I also add a dummy for Duma leadership since the chair and deputy chairs are likely to speak more on the floor. Finally, I include a dummy variable for party leaders.

In these models, I include vote type (SMD) to account for the voting system that elected a deputy. Seniority measures the years in office that a deputy has spent in the Duma, while exposure measures the time spent in office during a convocation on a day-level as a control. Finally, I also include variables for age and gender.

Results

To examine overall floor participation and to investigate the main inquiry into participatory practices over time, I employ three separate model specifications across six models, two specifications of which are included in the appendix as a robustness check. The two model specifications in the appendix include pooled results, controlling for convocation. However, the main analysis of this chapter tests for changes in participation between convocations, as it is reasonable to expect that the effects of the model predictors may differ due to our priors about the Duma's legislative development. For example, a hardening party system over time may crowd deputies out from the floor due to intraparty competition (i.e., a negative *faction percent* variable). In this case, we would expect a larger negative effect of *faction percent* in later convocations, but not necessarily in the earlier ones. In other words, convocation may moderate the slope and direction of the predictors.

To account for potential differences in participation between convocations, I conduct a subgroup analysis by interacting the convocation factor variable with the variables of interest in a linear mixed-effects model (*Model 1*), holding the Second Convocation as a reference category. This analysis aims to capture whether the floor time practices within the Duma differ across convocations (i.e., regime context). I use random effects conditioned on deputy, which account for heterogeneity in individual engagement on the floor and different speaking styles. However, I do not interact convocation with electoral system (SMD) because this would introduce a rank deficiency. Instead, I address these changes in the next chapter. Hence, I hold electoral system constant across convocations in *Model 1*.

This approach maintains statistical power compared to a stratification approach, which models each convocation separately (and implicitly assumes that convocation affects age and gender, among other theoretical issues). Such an approach may reveal that a given predictor is important in a particular convocation but cannot demonstrate *how* its importance changes between convocations. By contrast, the information provided by each interaction in the moderation approach can help show general changes or deviations. *Table 5* (in the appendix) presents the full results of this model (interactions and main effects). The AIC is 30,264.98. The marginal R^2 is 0.15 and the conditional R^2 sits at 0.47 for this specification, indicating that the random effects significantly improve model fit. The more complete model brings the AIC value down from 30,661.56. This suggests that the inclusion of the convocation relationship on the predictor variables improves the full model. The results are significant for interactions on party leadership, Duma leadership, faction percent, and largest party. Moreover, the pooled models including fixed effects for convocation indicate that Duma leadership, party leadership, and committee percent are significant in and of themselves across convocations.

The results of the analysis reveal that the effect of ruling party on floor time is only differentiated in the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh convocations, while the Third to Fourth convocations are not significantly different from the Second. This indicates that these earlier periods do not moderate the effect of the governing party on floor time. The coefficients reveal stark differences between the Seventh ($\beta = 540.69$) and all other convocations which have negative slopes. *Figure 4* illustrates the marginal effects of this finding. The effect of convocation on word count is significantly greater in the Seventh rather than in the Sixth convocation. This finding is noteworthy because it shows United Russia takes precedence on the floor only in the Seventh convocation, despite establishing itself as the dominant party in 2004. The fact that this the finding is only relevant in the later convocation (2016 and onwards) suggests a change in parliamentary practices under authoritarian periods, where the dominant party begins to be differentiated. The Fifth Duma is also notable for its sharp negative slope indicating more of an aversion of United Russia taking floor time than other convocations.

Figure 4. Marginal effects of words/exposure in convocation (ruling party) with 95% confidence intervals



The effect of faction percentage by convocation may offer insights into whether a party's control of floor time is a result of a cohesive party program of flooding the floor with deputies or whether the party is relying on key speechmakers. The percentage of deputies in a faction can be seen as an indirect measure of intraparty competition for floor time and a direct measure party-based delegation. Therefore, if more deputies take the floor, I expect the slope to be positive or at least horizontal, indicating less competition and open delegation. However, if fewer deputies take more floor time, the slope should be negative with restrictive delegation practices. As in the previous result, only the Sixth and Seventh convocations are significant. The previous four convocations do not show an effect of convocation and faction percent on floor time.

Once again, stark differences abound between the convocations. The coefficients indicate that intraparty competition and party-based delegation is higher in the Seventh (β = -852.63.11) compared to the Sixth (β = 811.35) and Fifth (β = 1,183.65) convocations. *Figure 5* illustrates the associated marginal effects.

Figure 5. Marginal effects of words/speeches in convocation (faction percent) with 95% confidence intervals



Accordingly, the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh convocations appear to diverge significantly from the preceding four in terms of both the effect of both ruling party and faction percentage on floor time. Specifically, the Seventh convocation exhibits a large negative effect of faction percentage juxtaposed against positive coefficients, suggesting that key party members are increasingly taking the floor. Additionally, the ruling party appears to have a greater influence on floor time during this period. Otherwise, the slope for faction percent would level off rather than show a dramatic negative effect. These findings may point towards a shift to a more hierarchical party program with a focus on leadership and stronger restrictions on speech delegation.

One might expect that these so-called key players are involved with leadership roles in the Duma Council, party, or committees. However, in the case of committees, the data does not support the hypothesis that a committee leadership roles amount to more floor time between convocations. However, the results are more nuanced for Duma-wide and party leadership roles.

Party leadership is significant for the Sixth and Fifth convocations and the Sixth convocation is significantly different from the Fifth (β = 113.50; β = 196.73). *Figure 6* details these differences with the interaction grouped by the factor-level of ruling party (ruling party = triangle).

Figure 6. Marginal effects of words/speeches in convocation (party leadership) by party type with 95% confidence intervals



The grouping in the graph emphasises the differences between convocations at different levels of ruling party status. In general, the results show that party leaders spend time differently on the floor between the Sixth and Fifth convocation, with leaders in the opposition leaders in the Fifth convocation spending a less amount of time on the floor compared to the Sixth. Meanwhile, the ruling party leaders spend more time during the Sixth. This aligns with the finding from *Figure 2*, which showed that the membership of United Russia significantly and substantially took seats in the Duma, and clearly affects the word count compared to the opposition's previous behaviour.

It is noteworthy that the time spent on the floor by non-party leaders in the opposition decreased between these convocations. This strongly supports the previous findings that suggest fewer deputies take the floor compared to 'key players' (who are typically associated with party leadership). This aligns with the expectations outlined in the appendix's pooled models: party leaders taking advantage of floor time coincides with a negative trend in faction percentage on the floor. In other words, smaller parties encourage leadership to take up more time. However, since these tendencies only significantly differentiate in the Sixth Convocation, it suggests that something other than a hardening party system is impacting intraparty competition for floor space. Otherwise we would expect significant differences in these variables would begin during the commonly accepted divergence in the Fourth Convocation (Gel'man 2006) or should continue into the Seventh Convocation with the introduction of parliamentary rules aimed at curtailing dissenting speech. Instead, the results indicate that party-based delegation changed in nature slightly later than the establishment of the party-of-power system and do not follow the changes to the formal regulations.

The differences in Duma-wide leadership positions are also pronounced between the Fifth to Seventh convocations and stratify between opposition and government. *Figure 7* provides the marginal effects across convocation and opposition status for this variable, showing that the slope levels gradually change from favouring opposition leaders to government leaders. Note that while the deviation in slope changes significantly from the Fifth to Seventh , the levels of the slope also change according to party status (β = 162.76; β = 116.30; β = 223.66).

Figure 7. Marginal effects of words/speeches in convocation (Duma Leadership) with 95% confidence intervals



The effect of leadership not only increases over time, but by party type and closely mirrors the effect of party leadership. The similarity in effect is most probably due to the strong collinearity with party leadership since party leadership positions determine the Duma leadership. In turn, this effect indicates that these Duma positions are increasingly used by United Russia to control floor time. This could be an indication of an increase in the importance of these positions during the later convocation, and that it carries a different role in speechmaking. The graph for the Seventh convocation further indicates the stark contrast in the change which occurred between government and opposition.

These results indicate a marked change in the effects of the predictors between the Seventh convocations and all others, indicating a substantial shift in the institutions governing parliamentary debate over time. Therefore, aggregate results found in the appendix must be qualified against these primary results. For instance, a large negative effect of faction percent in the pooled regressions is clearly driven by the Seventh convocation. The following section will conclude this analysis and consider the potential broader implications of these results.

Conclusions and Discussion

The Russian case shows that party-based informal rules largely shape the debate structure of the Duma in later convocations. In the case of Duma leadership positions, a combination of formal and informal constraints produces the distinct pattern: Duma chairpersons and their deputies take up more floor time. Regulations permit these chairs to speak when not presiding, and factions hold sway over the process by controlling the allocation of these assignments – usually related to their own leadership. In the case of factions, informal constraints are stronger. Floor access and time are determined by factional choices (e.g., allotments). This is particularly relevant because, since a 2006 rule change, faction members may not leave a faction that they were elected. However, this pattern only emerges after 2016. This suggests that the changes in practices between convocations are not simply the result of party-based rule changes but reflect wider changes in participatory practices. For instance, the constraints more strongly centralise speech-making practices under party leadership after 2011, rather than 2006. Therefore, while floor access is theoretically open to all deputies, the strengthening of informal constraints limits the amount of speaking time that a given deputy may receive. Moreover, with the post-2012 speech length changes (captured from the Sixth convocation onwards), party leadership is incentivised to take to the floor to control party image in the constrained time allotted by the rules. However, these changes to speechmaking are more dramatic in the Seventh Convocation, indicating that the formal changes to the rules during the earlier period of the Sixth Convocation are not the sole cause of practical change. Instead, these changes are best described by a combination of the informal party-based constraints and ad hoc changes to the rules of procedure, which fully coalesced into the Seventh Convocations unique situation.

If the Duma serves as a symbolic representation of the executive's legitimacy, it is logical that debates are held and conducted in a manner similar to democratic ones, even if they do not alter the substance of the law. However, these constraints may diminish the potential quality of debate. Taylor argues that good parliamentary debate 'should have many participants and contributions should be evenly distributed across the membership' (2021). Yet, in the Russian case, regular members are largely excluded from speaking time in those convocations. Nonetheless, when compared to presidential democracies (e.g., Chile or Mexico), the Duma does not exhibit any truly exceptional patterns in these later convocations. In fact, it largely conforms to the patterns found in Mexico, such as the substantial effect of party leadership and party size (see Magar 2021; Alemán, Ramírez, and Slapin 2017).

These results are unsurprising if we accept Taylor's perspective on legislative debate in presidential systems: deputies use debates as opportunities to express their positions, and that the institution of debate provides a normative foundation for the state to pass its laws (2021). However, they also reveal that Taylor's perspective does not easily apply to the earlier Dumas, suggesting that speeches in these contexts differ significantly from those of a typical presidential system. This is surprising considering that the Duma moved from functioning within a presidential system into an increasingly super-presidential system. The delegation structures of these debates change across convocations and regime types, indicating that the consolidation of the state and party system appear to have a greater impact on parliamentary access compared to an abstract regime classification.

The strongest effects on speechmaking are related to the governing party and share of parliament represented by a deputy's committee and faction. This reflects a competition effect: those in larger factions must compete for speaking time or risk being left out – this incentivises parliamentarians not to engage in intraparty dissent. Moreover, since parties control high-level assignments, they also indirectly delegate speaking access. Key party members, in turn, can take more floor time. In other words, since formal party control over these assignments is roughly constant across democratic and authoritarian periods, the data suggests that the competition effect is moderated by party leadership decisions. Along with the fact that the heads of factions hold much of this floor time and serve as the primary allocators of it, the rules governing debate tend towards informality. The reliance on these informal rules allows parties to exert control over their members and therefore reward loyalists, particularly in United Russia. As such, faction allotments are impactful, and these posts are the rewards of working within the faction *and* aligning with the government in later convocations.

The data suggest that party unity is significantly more important than personal vote seeking over time. Parliamentary speeches may therefore serve as signalling opportunities for these actors. On the one hand, the dominance of United Russia over floor time in later convocations may simply serve to suppress opposition voices. On the other hand, allowing opposition leaders to speak may serve a dual purpose of signalling cooperation with the regime and limiting the access of backbenchers on the floor. However, these effects are only substantially different during the later convocations, indicating a quantifiable and substantial difference in speechmaking practices.

Leadership positions for both opposition and governmental parties increase average allocated floor time across later convocations. Moreover, the Seventh convocation differentiates itself as United Russia leaders begin to dominate the floor rather than the past examples of opposition dominance. Earlier convocations do not show a difference between these posts and floor time. Therefore, the effects only come into play during the coalesced authoritarian period. While party unity is not directly measured, the results indicate that leaders value unity in later convocations by taking to the floor more often (and therefore taming potential dissenting voices or those who move beyond the party line).

This chapter discussed the determinants of legislative debate in the Russian parliamentary system focussing on dynamic change over time. It found that the later authoritarian period significantly differs in parliamentary practice. However, the chapter deliberately did not address what, if any, are the causal effects of the electoral regime on parliamentary speech between convocations. The following chapter explores the dynamics of the electoral system on floor access. It provides a more robust causal model that takes advantage of the electoral rule changes by convocation using a staggered difference-in-differences design to estimate across multiple time periods (Callaway and Sant'Anna 2021). The findings suggest that debates play an important role in the Duma, even in authoritarian periods, and highlight the need to consider the incentives and constraints on participation in these contexts. This provides an advantage for understanding several of the hypotheses related to SMD and PR electoral types.

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Appendix

Table 5 detailed below presents the linear mixed-effects models, including interactions of convocation on predictor variables. Age, gender, and seniority are excluded from the interactions because of the theoretical prior that their effects should not vary between convocations. SMD is excluded from the interaction since convocation 4 and 5 have no SMD deputies (and hence introduce a rank deficiency). The models are therefore interpreted taking SMD as an overall control into account All interactions are included in a single model.

Regression results

	Dependent variable:
	count_text_by_speech
Age	-0.03
	(0.24)
log(exposure_convocation)	-2.45
	(3.29)
years_office.convocation	**-1.26****
	(0.59)
convocationThird	17.07
	(25.37)
convocationFourth	14.67
	(42.31)
convocationFifth	-58.79
	(64.97)
convocationSixth	-2.22
	(39.51)
convocationSeventh	165.40***
	(44.15)
largest_party1	0.98
	(41.84)
faction_percent	-23.82
	(191.29)
Leadership1	-10.58
	(39.93)

party_leader1	8.69
	(51.71)
SMD1	-8.47
	(5.23)
Committee.chair	-4.50
	(17.54)
Committee.leadership	1.38
	(12.26)
com_perc	-36.80
	(116.73)
female1	1.71
	(7.26)
convocationThird:largest_party1	4.28
	(43.54)
convocationFourth:largest_party1	-218.62
	(255.73)
convocationFifth:largest_party1	**-569.11***
	(321.93)
convocationSixth:largest_party1	**-312.72*****
	(82.55)
convocationSeventh:largest_party1	**541.26***
	(296.03)
convocationThird:faction_percent	-31.66
	(203.94)
convocationFourth:faction_percent	410.42
	(456.06)
convocationFifth:faction_percent	**987.05***
	(574.15)
convocationSixth:faction_percent	**735.38*****
	(271.05)
convocationSeventh:faction_percent	**-858.86***
	(478.53)
convocationThird:Leadership1	28.34
	(52.09)
convocationFourth:Leadership1	67.29
	(48.34)
convocationFifth:Leadership1	**174.30*****
	(51.69)

convocationSixth:Leadership1	**126.94****
	(50.90)
convocationSeventh:Leadership1	**239.37*****
	(51.24)
convocationThird:party_leader1	-4.20
	(57.00)
convocationFourth:party_leader1	74.37
	(57.75)
convocationFifth:party_leader1	**210.48*****
	(66.89)
convocationSixth:party_leader1	**118.30***
	(61.80)
convocationSeventh:party_leader1	153.14
	(98.88)
convocationThird:Committee.chair	-24.45
	(25.61)
convocationFourth:Committee.chair	-32.18
	(25.56)
convocationFifth:Committee.chair	-1.08
	(24.05)
convocationSixth:Committee.chair	-2.86
	(23.98)
convocationSeventh:Committee.chair	30.85
	(25.87)
convocationThird:Committee.leadership	-7.99
	(15.75)
convocationFourth:Committee.leadership	-10.94
	(15.88)
convocationFifth:Committee.leadership	-20.93
	(16.13)
convocationSixth:Committee.leadership	-3.31
	(15.67)
convocationSeventh:Committee.leadership	12.40
	(16.25)
convocationThird:com_perc	13.65
	(166.10)
convocationFourth:com_perc	-276.83
	(192.34)

convocationFifth:com_perc	-41.95
	(157.41)
convocationSixth:com_perc	-124.27
	(137.37)
convocationSeventh:com_perc	-245.06
	(166.64)
Constant	114.79***
	(32.87)
Observations	2,547
Log Likelihood	-15,081.79
Akaike Inf. Crit.	30,273.57
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	30,594.92
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

I use two separate model specifications to capture overall floor participation across convocations. Table 6 presents the results of the initial regression analysis. I utilise a stepwise approach, starting with the null model, and sequentially adding controls, *Status* variables, *Deputy* variables, and finally the full specifications with fixed and random effects. In both dependent variables, I include convocation fixed effects to allow comparability across legislatures. However, unlike in the Slapin and Proksch format (2021), I do not include party fixed effects as their inclusion did not alter the model output. In *DV2*, I include random effects as in *Model 1*. The final output presented includes the full specifications with and without fixed and random effects.

I fit *DV1* using negative binomial models. Both models fit the data well, as indicated by the overdispersion parameter *theta*, where a value of 1.00 accounts for overdispersion. Therefore, it was not necessary to use a zero-inflated model. The inclusion of fixed effects increased the parameter by 0.02. However, the complete model performs better overall, as indicated by its lower AIC value.

Models 3 and 4 use OLS, and 5 uses linear mixed effects to include a random effect for deputy. Model 4 shows the convocation fixed effect, which slightly improves the model fit with an adjusted R^2 value of 0.21. This value is promising considering the noise inherent to such models. Finally, Model 5 has an AIC of 15,787.32 which performs better than the null model (16,582), and a conditional R^2 of 0.40 indicating a strong fit. Further details on likelihood ratio tests and ANOVA tables can be found further in the appendix.

Table 6. Pooled regression results

	Dependent variable:				
	Speeches in convocation (*DV1*)		Words/exposure in convocation (*DV2*)		
	Negative binomial		*OLS*		*Linear mixed-effects*
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	0.003	0.003	-0.03**	-0.02**	-0.02
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Exposure (logged)	1.05***	1.03***			
	(0.05)	(0.05)			
Seniority	0.05***	0.05***	0.41***	0.33***	0.29***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ruling party	-0.02	-0.01	-1.21***	0.06	0.08
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.45)	(0.48)	(0.44)
Faction percent	-1.03***	-1.12***	-1.68**	-6.02***	-5.57***

	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.81)	(1.04)	(0.96)
Leadership	-0.02	-0.08	2.01**	2.26***	0.65
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.85)	(0.84)	(0.83)
Party leader	0.15	0.22	5.33***	5.58***	2.80***
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.86)	(0.86)	(0.87)
SMD	0.19***	0.12**	-0.30	0.28	0.17
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.24)	(0.28)	(0.27)
Committee chair	0.71***	0.73***	4.73***	5.00***	4.95***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.42)
Committee deputy chair	0.15***	0.19***	0.70***	0.86***	0.75***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.24)
Committee percent	-2.46***	-2.70***	-4.78	-4.71	-5.87
	(0.86)	(0.85)	(4.81)	(4.76)	(4.69)
Gender female	0.04	0.05	0.17	0.04	0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.35)	(0.34)	(0.37)
Constant	-4.12***	-4.04***	4.17***	5.69***	5.52***
	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.68)	(0.76)	(0.78)
Convocation FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Deputy RE	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	2,542	2,542	2,542	2,542	2,542
Adjusted R^2			0.19	0.21	
Marginal/Conditional R^2					0.18/0.40
theta	1.00*** (0.03)	1.02*** (0.03)			
Akaike Inf. Crit.	22,877.47	22,833.47			15,787.32
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

There are four notable findings in the model specifications. First, seniority, as measured by years held in office, slightly increases both the number of speeches given and the amount of floor time. However, the effect is almost indistinguishable from zero. Second, faction percent has a significant negative impact on both the number of words spoken and speeches given, indicating a decrease in both floor access and speaking time. Holding other variables constant, during a ‘convocation-day’, a member of a faction with 75% of the overall share is predicted to speak 2.6 words, compared to a member of a faction of 25% who will speak 5.8 words, nearly twice as many.[6] The effect of faction percent is interesting, given that factions are the most powerful bodies in the Duma, aside from the Chair and Council (Sakwa 2020). Faction leaders wield a significant influence over their members. The negative effect suggests that floor time is coveted within factions: as members compete for space at the expense of others. Considered alongside the finding that fact that party leaders spend more time on the floor (*DV2*), a picture emerges of a robust party hierarchy.

Third, committee chairs have a large positive impact on the number of words spoken and the number of speeches given. Holding all else constant, a chairperson is predicted to speak 9.93 words per exposure period, compared to a non-chair that will speak 4.93. Committee chairs also give about 30 more speeches than regular members. Committee leadership positions also lead to an increase in the speech and word count. Fourth, an interesting finding in Model 2 is that committee percent significantly decreases floor access. These are similar to those for faction percent and party leadership results, in that they suggest a hierarchical debate structure in in which leadership speaks and regular members are less active. However, the underlying mechanisms may differ slightly between the two.

Figure 3 presents the average marginal effects for Model 2, which more clearly illustrates these aggregate trends. With respect to the number of speeches given, party leaders, committee chairs, and their deputies give more speeches, while faction percent decreases the number of speeches given. It is worth noting that committee percent is not shown on the graph due to space – its effect is heavily skewed negative with a large confidence interval. Several variables of note are indistinguishable from zero, including ruling party and Duma leadership positions, which show almost no effect on the dependent variable. This latter result is significant as it suggests that the Chair and their deputies are not dominating the speeches given, despite their apparent privileged access. SMD voting only slightly increases the number of speeches given. Only one of the variables – Duma leadership – has a positive divergence in the number of words spoken for *DV2*, implying that while leadership positions do not support more privileged floor access, they do provide more floor time.

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[6] Note: convocation-day is representing the number of days sat in convocation, not the number of potential meetings due to lack of data availability. Hence, the word count value is severely deflated. However, this metric still makes it possible to compare floor time access.

The remaining variables all show a consistent relationship across specifications, indicating that floor access and floor time are directly proportional in these cases. In other words, the Duma does not privilege floor time over the number of speeches given for *status* or *deputy* variables. This relationship suggests that the regulations are applied equally, on average, across different categories of deputies. If the regulations were applied differently, it is possible that at least one predictor would show a sign flip or a large divergence across the specifications. For instance, as in democracies, SMD deputies have an impetus to speak more on the floor. If the regulations were not equally applied, it is conceivable that the proportion of floor time could exceed the number of speeches given due to the intrinsic competition within this group of deputies.

Figure 9. Average marginal effects of speeches in convocation with 95% confidence intervals



Note: Committee percent is omitted due to the extreme negative values (AME=-107.28, lower β -174.27, upper = -40.28). These values, albeit with a wide range, indicate that committee percent has a non-negligible negative effect.

The tables presented below present likelihood ratio and analysis of variance tables for the set of models included in the analysis. *Model 0a* is the null model for *DV1* using speech count per convocation as the response variable. *Model 0b* is the null model for *DV2*. The ANOVA for *Model 3* and *Model 4* use restricted maximum likelihood, while *Model 5* is fit with maximum likelihood due to the random term. I also include a separate ANOVA comparing *Model 5* to *Model 4* to assist with selection. All models reject the null hypothesis. The fixed effects models outperform their counterparts. The random effects model also improve upon the fixed effects model for *DV2*. These results indicate that the models used in the analysis are robust across the board.

Table 7a. Likelihood ratio tests *DV1 (speeches in convocation)*

	theta	Resid. df	2 x Log-lik	Test	Df	LR Stat.	Pr(>χ)
Model 0a	0.75	2,541	-23,679.47				
Model 1	1.00	2,529	-22,849.47	1 vs 0	12	829.10	0.00^{***}
Model 2	1.02	2,524	-22,795.47	2 vs 0	17	883.10	0.00^{***}

Note: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Table 7b. Analysis of variance table *DV2 OLS (words/exposure in convocation)*

	Resid. df	RSS	Df	Sum of Sq.	F	Pr(>F)
Model 0b	2,541	101,322				
Model 3	2,530	82,072	11	19,251	53.95	0.00^{***}
Model 4	2,525	79,802	16	21,521	42.558	0.00^{***}

Note: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Table 7c. Analysis of variance table *DV2 LME (words/exposure in convocation)*

	npar	AIC	BIC	Log-lik	Deviance	Chi sq.	Df	Pr(>χ^2)
Model 0b	2	16,586	16,598	-8,291.0	16,582			
Model 5	19	15,776	15,887	-7,869.2	15,738	843.61	17	0.00^{***}

Note: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Table 7c. Analysis of variance table *DV2 LME (words/exposure in convocation)*

	npar	AIC	BIC	Log-lik	Deviance	Chi sq.	Df	Pr(>χ^2)
Model 4	18	16,011	16,116	-7,987.6	15,975			
Model 5	19	15,776	15,887	-7,869.2	15,738	843.61	1	0.00^{***}

Note: $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$